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POINT l
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THERE WERE GENUINE
ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS AND PLAINTIFFS WERE
NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Plaintiffs claim that "defendants never denied that the Uniform
Real Estate Contract attached to Mr. Hall's affidavit was not the agreed
contract" (P. 4).

This simply is not true.

In their proposed Amended

Answer defendants asserted that the Exhibit "A" (which was incomplete
on the Complaint) was not the agreement of the parties as it did not
contain a release clause as agreed upon.

There is nothing in Mr. Hall's

affidavit which expressly refers to a release clause so that defendants
would risk being foreclosed -. on that issue for failure to rebut it under
oath.
With respect to Rule 56{e), plaintiffs ignore the alternative to an
affidavit provided therein, to-wit a response "as otherwise provided in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

this Rule.

11

Before the ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment

defendants moved to amend their Answer.

That motion was not ruled upon

and hence the conditions set forth in Rule 56(d) were not met, to-wit
"judgment is not rendered upon the whole case" as the issue as to a
release clause was not ruled upon and had not been addressed by the
subject affidavit.
ipse

dix~t

Plaintiffs seek to avoid the foregoing by contending

that "amendments to defendants' Answer do not substantially

change the issues as originally formulated" (P. 4).

In the next para-

graph, however, it is conceded that it raised the issue of the release
clause but that·such issue does not constitute a legal defense as it
"would not affect defendants' liability to make full and timely payment
to the plaintiffs. 11

Defendants do not contend that such a clause would

affect their liability to pay as agreed but it certainly would affect
their ability to make such payments since sales of release ground have
been the means of performance on this type of contract.

At the very least

the Court could not properly conclude otherwise without an evidentiary
hearing.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE WHICH BY DUE DILIGENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN
DISCOVERED AND PRESENTED AT THE TIME THE COURT HEARD
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Plaintiffs contend that the newly discovered evidence (that plaintiffs
had arranged with their sellers to apply plaintiffs' payment to those
sellers on the contract which had to be kept current to perform the instant
2
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contract) was

11

the exclusive knowledge of defendants-appellants (at

critical times)-

11

Not so.

The newly discovered evidence was not the

payment made by defendants to Leland Fitzgerald {plaintiffs' seller)
which initially was in their knowledge to the exclusion of plaintiffs'
knowledge but rather the application of that payment (to the contract
referred to in paragraph 11 of the subject contract) rather than the
retention of that payment by Fitzgerald toward a new contract contemplated between him and defendants if

~laT-fttfffs

defaulted out.

Knowledge

of the application was exclusively known only to plaintiffs and Fitzgerald
and the latter's affidavit made it clear that defendants learned of this
evidence only since the summary judgment was rendered (R. 79).
Without any support in the record whatsoever plaintiffs maRe the
pejorative assertion that there was "collusion" between their sellers
Fitzgerald and the Fitzgerald defendants (P. 6).

Certainly neither

the lower court nor this one may so find without an evidentiary hearing.
In the same paragraph they assert that the payment was partial which is
contrary to the facts (R. 79).
When plaintiffs assert that the payment in question was "without the
consent or knowledge of the plaintiff" they again confuse the payment
with its application to their contract with their seller which could only
have been made with their knowledge and consent.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS PLAINTIFFS HAD NOT
PASSED TITLE TO DEFENDANTS IN ACCORD WITH PARAGRAPH·
16 OF THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT.
3
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A

Title was not Properly Passed from Plaintiffs
to Defendanta via a Warranty Deed Deposited
with the Fourth Judicial District Court.
Plaintiffs seek to dispose of this issue with a single sentence
based entirely on ipse dixit.

It is too elementary to require case

citation to establish the fact that a deed which is lodged in a court
file does not establish the claim of title necessary to convey good
marketable title.

No authority is given as to the power of defendants

to remove the deed from the court file even if its location there were
the only objection to its passing title.

Certainly the filing in

court of a deed in a regular real property transfer would be insufficient
and the burden is on plaintiffs to establish the validity of such a
deli very.
B

An Issue Not Raised in11the Court Below May Be
Raised on Appeal when the Lower Court does not
Conduct a Trial.
Defendants would agree with this part of plaintiffs brief if the
case had reached the final stage of where the defense of failure to state
a claim may be asserted under Rule 12(h) but this case never reached that
stage and hence it may be raised here since defendants did not have the
final opportunity to raise it in the lower court at the time provided by
the rule because of the procedure utilized by the lower ourt.

It surely

is contrary to the spirit of pleading under the rules for the Court not
to decide causes on the merits unless the rules clearly foreclose that
being done.
4
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c
Defendants did not Waive Any Objection to
Plaintiffs' Tender of Title.
Plaintiffs contend under this point that the defense of failure
to "pass title to Buyers (defendants)_•l· pursuant to paragraph 16C of
the subject contract is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded
specifically under Rule 8{c).

Rule 8 , however, lists all the 19

defenses denominated and this defense is not one of those enumerated.

As noted above it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to both plead and to
prove the perfonnance or compliance with every covenant and condition
to establish a legal claim and Rule S·(c-) does not have the legal effect
of shifting that burden.

Furthermore, as is true with respect to nearly

every legal proposition urged upon this Court by plaintiffs,plaintiffs
cite no case precedent to sustain their position on this issue.
D

The Fourth Judicial District Court did not
Properly Foreclose the Subject Unjform Real
Estate Contract as a Note and Mortgage.
At this point in their brief plaintiffs concede that "there must be
a validly executed deed and delivery of the deed" (P. 9).

They contend,

however, that a delivery to the clerk of the court of a deed to be filed
in the foreclosure file is a valid delivery.
ordinary proposition is cited.
that deed cited.
that factor.

No case for this extra-

Nor is any authority of the clerk to deliver

Nor has the judgment appealed from in this case addressed

Surely defendants did not bargain merely for a valid "trans-

action between the parties" (P. 9).

They bargained for and should receive

5
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a deed that gives them good marketable title of record.

Certainly the

deed which is R84 does not do that.
Plaintiffs correctly observe that defendants object to a deed from
plaintiffs only when the title remained in plaintiffs' sellers (Leland
A. Fitzgerald and wife).
Plaintiffs cite two cases to support the proposition that plaintiffs need not have marketable title to sustain their action and the
validity of the deed in question.
In the Woodward case, the first cited which is reported as l U. 2d 220,
265 P.2d 398 {1953) plaintiffs there did not sue for the full price as the
instant plaintiffs have done but "only as a request for judgment as to
such installments and attorneys'

fees~

(P. 399).

There the court said:

Defendant's attack on the marketability of plaintiff's
title was premature since, under the authorities, that fact
is determinable, not as of the date of execution of the
contract but as of the time a vendee tenders that which
under the contract, would require the vendor to transfer
not only marketable title, but the title which the latter
agreed to convey.
Here the issue of marketability of seller's title is not premature
because the issue was not raised as of the contract's execution but as of
the time the contract required the title to pass.

At that time the

quality of the title is most germane to the intention of the parties and
to the terms of the contract.
The second case plaintiffs cited on the issue of marketability of
title is Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 U.2d 47, 513 P.2d 417 (1973).
That case involved an action by sellers to terminate the contract due
to buyer's breaches and a consolidated action by buyer for specific
performance rather than a 16 C action under a uniform real estate contract
6
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as in this case.

There the court, consistent with Woodward, supra, said:

"First, the law does not require the vendor to have
clear and marketable title at all times during the
perfonnance of his contract and is not ordinarily so
obligated until the time comes for him to perform
(undersea ring added).
In the instant case the time for performance had arrived and unless
the plaintiffs

had

such marketable title as would enable them to convey

good marketable title to defendants as purchasers, then their deed would
not and did not meet the requirements of 16 C.
It's true that defendants have not found a case exactly in point to
sustain their position on this issue as this case is apparently one of
first impression but certainly neither of the cases cited by plaintiffs
are anywhere near being "on all fours.
supports plaintiffs' position.

11

In fact their dicta strongly

Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the

lack of precedent in this situation is probably due to the fact that prior
sellers did not believe they could succeed in obtaining a judgment for the
full purchase price under 16 C unless they could deliver the full title
rather than a fraction of the full title since the contract contemplated
full title for full price.
As for the two cases cited by plaintiffs regarding the necessity of
a "tender of deed" those cases would be useless even if they stood for
the proposition that no such tender would be required in circumstances
like those in this case since the contractual provision in question
required plaintiffs to "pass title to buyer" not "tender title to buyer."
Howe~er

the holdings in Vanderwilt v. Broerman, 201 Iowa 1107, 206 NW 559
7
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(1926) and Miami Bond and Mortgage Company v. Bell 133 So. 547 {Florida,
1931) involved factual situations totally different from this case.

In

the first case 11 the suit is under the statute against the vender in
possession to foreclose" (P. 962).

The statute in question {Sec. 4297)

provided inter alia:
The vendor may file his petition asking the Court
to require the purchaser to perform his contract or
to foreclose and sell his interest in the property.
The Court in its opinion observed that the lower court "could so mold
its decree as to protect the interests of a-ll 11 (P. 962).
The difference between the statute in Vanderwilt and the contract in
this case is so vast as to make the dicta in that case meaningless in deciding
rights and duties under this contract.
In Bell the court said:
This is not a suit at law to recover the full purchase
price of the lands to be conveyed nor is it one for specific
performance of a contract and therefore the rule that "where
in a contract for the sale of land the covenant of vendee to
pay the purchase price and the covenant of the vendor to
convey are dependent and both covenants are to be performed
at the same time and the tender of deed is a condition
precedent to an action at law to recover the total purchase
price and to the maintenance by the vendor of an action in
equity for specific performance of the contract" is not
applicable.
Here the suit was one to recover the full purchase price and is in
substance an action for specific performance and hence the rule quoted would
be applicable except for the fact that the contract by its express terms
required a conveyance rather than a tender as noted above.
E

The Error in Plaintiffs' Conveyance of Title Was
Not Harmless Error and Defendants Were Prejudiced
Thereby
8
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It's hard to conceive of a case where there was more prejudice caused
a party in a case involving sums under half a million dollars than in this
case.

To state as plaintiffs do on Page 10 of their brief that "defendants

were not prejudiced thereby" is the sheerest of ipse dixit reasoning which
flies in the face of reality, the reality that defendants have a judgment
against them for roughly half a million dollars in return for property of
that approximate value which is subject to a prior encumbrance of over 50%
of that value.

If getting half a loaf for full price of the loaf is not

prejudicial, that tenn has no meaning.

Certainly, neither Startin f237

P 2d 834, a.1951 case) nor Boyd (146 P 272, a 1915 case) do not stand for
the proposition that getting half of that bargained for is not prejudicial.
The first involved the value of services rather than the diminished value
of property because title is still in sellers' sellers until over 50% of
the value is paid to them.
at bar as to be useless.

That case is so extremely remote from the one
The second is even more remote as it involved a

tort action for wrongful death.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN
ACCORD WITH SEC. 78-37-1 AND SEC. 78-37-2, UTAH CODE,
1953.
A

The Fourth Judicial District Court did not Prope.!:lt.
Adjudge an Amount Due.
Plaintiffs contend under this point that ''adjudging the amount due" is
equivalent to "entering judgment for the sum determined to be due."
is not so.

This

Certainly it is not necessary that judgment for the amount due

must be entered as distinguished from fts determination·

to "make bids or

make disbursements to the parties" (P. 11).
9
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To interpret Sec. 78-37-1 in the above manner is to defeat its
purpose, namely to have the debt satisfied primarily by the security in
question so that other real property of the debtor is not impaired
pending the detennination of the deficiency, if any.
B

Mootness is not an Issue in This Appeal.
Plaintiffs cite facts outside the record and violate their own urging
that this Court not consider matters not presented to the lower court.
It would obviously be improper for this court to adjudicate the legal
effect of facts accurring after this appeal was instituted and particularly
when plaintiff sought by the execution sale of July 1, 1982, to do an end
run around Perkins v. Spencer by the exercise of 16 C and the purchase of
defendants• position to forfeit all payments made before which effectively
converted a 16 C remedy into a 16 A remedy in such a manner that the lower
court had no opportunity to apply the principles of Perkins v. Spencer
to these facts.

That case is reported in 121

U~

468, 243 P.2d 446.

CONCLUSION
The surrnnary judgment appealed from should be reversed and the case
tried upon its merits.
Dated this 20th day of September, 1982.

Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
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